The k-Means Clustering problem is one of the most-explored problems in data mining to date. With the advent of protocols that have proven to be successful in performing single database clustering, the focus has shifted in recent years to the question of how to extend the single database protocols to a multiple database setting. To date there have been numerous attempts to create specific multiparty k-means clustering protocols that protect the privacy of each database, but according to the standard cryptographic definitions of "privacy-protection," so far all such attempts have fallen short of providing adequate privacy.
INTRODUCTION

Background on k-Means Clustering
The k-means clustering problem can be described as follows: A database D holds information about n different objects, each object having d attributes. The information regarding each object is viewed as a coordinate in R d , and hence the objects are interpreted as data points living in ddimensional Euclidean space. Informally, k-means clustering algorithms are comprised of two steps. First, k initial centers are chosen in some manner, either at random or using some other "seeding" procedure. The second step is iterative (known as the "Lloyd Step"), and is described according to the following algorithm: Partition the n data points into k clusters based on which current cluster center they are closest to. Then reset the new cluster centers to be the center of mass (in Euclidean space) of each cluster. This process is either iterated a fixed number of times or until the new cluster centers are sufficiently close to the previous ones (based on a pre-determined measure of "sufficiently close"). The kmeans clustering method is enormously popular among practitioners as an effective way to find a geometric partitioning of data points into k clusters, from which general trends or tendencies can be observed. In particular, k-means clustering is widely used in information retrieval, machine learning, and data mining research (see e.g. [19] for further discussion about the enormous popularity of k-means clustering).
The question of finding efficient algorithms for solving the k-means clustering problem has been greatly explored and is not investigated in this paper. Rather, we wish to extend an existing algorithm (which solves the k-means problem for a single database without any concern for privacy) to an algorithm that works in the two-database setting (in accordance with multiparty computation literature, we refer to the databases as "parties"). In particular, if two parties each hold partial data describing the d attributes of n objects, then we would like to apply this k-means algorithm to the aggregate data (which lives in some virtual database) in a way that protects the privacy of each party member's data. In this paper, we will work in the most general setting, where we assume the data is arbitrarily partitioned between the two databases. This means that there is no assumption on how the attributes of the data are distributed among the parties (and in particular, this subsumes the cases of vertically and horizontally partitioned data).
Previous Work
The k-means clustering problem is one of the functions most studied in the more general class of data-mining problems. Data-mining problems have received much attention in recent years. Due to the sheer volume of inputs that are often involved in data-mining problems, generic multiparty computation (MPC) protocols become infeasible in terms of communication cost. This has led to constructions of function-specific multiparty protocols that attempt to handle a specific functionality in an efficient manner, while still providing privacy to the parties (see e.g. [16] , [1] , [2] ).
The problem of extending single database k-means clustering protocols to the multiparty setting has been explored by numerous authors, whose approaches have varied widely. The main challenge in designing such a protocol is to prevent intermediate values from being leaked during the Lloyd
Step. In particular, each iteration of the Lloyd Step requires k new cluster centers to be found, a process that requires division (the new cluster centers are calculated using a weighted average, which in turn requires dividing by the number of data points in a given cluster). However, the divisors should remain unknown to the parties, as leaking intermediate cluster sizes may reveal excessive information. Additionally, many current protocols for solving the single database k-means clustering problem improve efficiency by choosing data points according to a weighted distribution, which will then serve as preliminary "guesses" to the cluster center (e.g. [19] , [4] ). Choosing data points in this manner will also likely involve division.
A subtle issue that may not be obvious at first glance is how to perform these divisions in light of current cryptographic tools. In particular, most encryption schemes describe a message space that is a finite group (or field or ring). This means that an algorithm that attempts to solve the multiparty k-means problem in the cryptographic setting (as opposed to the information-theoretic setting) will view the data points not as elements of Euclidean Space R d , but rather as elements in G d (for some ring G) in order to share encryptions of these data points with the other party members. But this then complicates the notion of "division," which we wish to mean "division in R" as opposed to "multiplication by the inverse." (The latter interpretation not only fails to perform the desired task of finding an average, but additionally may not even exist if not all elements in the ring G have a multiplicative inverse).
Previous authors attempting to solve the multiparty kmeans problem have incorporated various ideas to combat this obstacle. The "data perturbation" technique (e.g. [1] , [2] , [17] ) avoids the issue altogether by addressing the multiparty k-means problem from an information-theoretic standpoint. These algorithms attempt to protect party members' privacy by having each member first "perturb" their data (in some regulated manner), and then the perturbed data is made public to all members. Thus, the division (and all other computations) can be performed locally by each party member (on the perturbed data), and the division problem is completely avoided. Unfortunately, all current algorithms utilizing this method do not protect the privacy of the party members in the cryptographic definition of privacy protection. Indeed, these protocols provide some privacy guarantee in terms of hiding the exact values of the database entries, but do not make the more general guarantee that (with overwhelming probability) no information can be obtained about any party's inputs (other than what follows from the output of the function, i.e. the final cluster centers).
Another solution to the division problem (see e.g. [24] ) is to have each party member perform the division locally on their own data. The problem with this method is that it requires each party to know all intermediate cluster assignments (in order to know what they should divide by). The same problem is encountered in [23] , which also requires each party to know intermediate cluster assignments. The extra information obtained by the parties in these two papers would not be available to the parties in the ideal model, and thus these solutions fail to provide complete privacy protection (see Section 2.3 for a formal definition of privacy protection). A similar problem is encountered in [14] , where they describe a way to privately perform division, but their protocol relies on the fact that both parties will learn the output value of the division (which is again more information than is revealed in the ideal model). Another approach, suggested by Jagannathan and Wright [13] is to interpret division as multiplication by the inverse. However, a simple example shows that this method does not satisfy correctness, i.e. does not correctly implement a k-means algorithm.
(Consider e.g. dividing 11 by 5 in Z21. One would expect to round this to 2, but 11*5 −1 = 11*17 = 19). One final approach encountered in the literature (see e.g. [3] , [6] , [7] , [8] ) protects against leaking information about specific data in a different context. In this setting, the data is not distributed among many parties, but rather exists in a single database that is maintained by a trusted third party. The goal now is to have clients send requests to this third party for k-means clustering information on the data, and to ensure that the response from the server does not reveal too much information about the data. In the model we consider in this paper, these techniques cannot be applied since there is no central database or trusted third party.
To summarize, none of the existing "privacy-preserving" k-means clustering protocols provide cryptographically-acceptable security against an "honest-but-curious" adversary. We will present a formal notion of security in Section 2.3 (see e.g. [10] ). Informally, the security of a multiparty protocol is defined by comparing the real-life interaction between the parties to an "ideal" scenario where a trusted third party exists. In this ideal setting, the trusted third party receives the private inputs from each of the parties, runs a k-means clustering algorithm on the aggregate data, and returns as output the final cluster centers to each party. (Note: depending on a pre-determined arrangement between the parties, the third party may also give each party the additional information of which cluster each data point belongs to.) The goal of multiparty computation is to achieve in the "real" world (where no trusted third party is assumed to exist) the same level of data privacy protection that can be obtained in the "ideal" model.
One final obstacle in designing a perfectly secure k-means clustering protocol comes from the iterative nature of the Lloyd Step. In the ideal model, the individual parties do not learn any information regarding the number of iterations that were necessary to reach the stopping condition.
In the body of this paper, our main protocol will reveal this information to the parties (it is our belief that in practice, this privacy breach is unlikely to reveal meaningful information about the other party's database). However, we discuss more fully in Appendix A alternative methods of controlling the number of iterations without revealing this extra information.
Our Results
We describe in Section 4 of this paper the first protocol for two-party k-means clustering that is secure against an honest-but-curious adversary (as mentioned above, general MPC protocols could in theory be applied to k-means, but any such protocol is unfeasible to use in practice; see Section 4.4 for a comparison). Moreover, we demonstrate that our protocol is competitive (in terms of communication and computation costs) with other current protocols (which fail to protect privacy against an honest-but-curious adversary). Let k denote the number of clusters, K is the security parameter, n is the number of data points, d is the number of attributes of each data point, and O(ξs) is the communication cost of (securely) finding the minimum of two numbers. The exact efficiency bounds that we achieve are as follows:
Communication Complexity Result. Our two-party secure k-means clustering protocol has a one-time communication cost of O(ndK), followed by O(nkξs) ≤ O(nkK 2 ) for each iteration of the Lloyd Step.
A complete discussion on the bounds achieved above can be found in Section 4.4. We remark that our honest-butcurious solution can be augmented using standard machinery (e.g., see [10, 12] and references therein) to the malicious adversary model.
Our protocol takes as a template the single-database protocol of Ostrovsky et al. [19] , and extends it to the two-party setting. We chose the particular protocol of [19] because it has two advantages over conventional single-database protocols: First, it provides a provable guarantee as to the correctness of its output (assuming moderate conditions on the data); and second, because their protocol reduces the number of iterations necessary in the Lloyd Step. However, the techniques we use to extend the single-database protocol of [19] can be readily applied to any single-database protocol. Furthermore, although our results focus on the two-party case, the techniques we use can be easily extended to the multi-party case.
In order to extend the single database protocol of [19] to a two-party protocol, we follow the setup and some of the ideas discussed by Jagannathan and Wright in [13] . In that paper, the authors attempt to perform secure two-party kmeans clustering, but (as they remark) fall short of perfect privacy due to leakage of information (including the number of data points in each cluster) that arises from an insecure division algorithm.
To solve the multiparty division problem, we define division in the ring ZN in a natural way, namely as the quotient Q from the Division Algorithm in the integers: P = QD+R. From this definition, we demonstrate how two parties can perform multiparty division in a secure manner. Additionally, we describe how two parties can select initial data points according to a weighted distribution. To accomplish this, we introduce a new protocol, the Random Value Protocol, which is described in Section 3.3. We note that the Random Value Protocol may be of independent interest as a subprotocol for other protocols that require random, oblivious sampling.
Our results utilize many existing tools and subprotocols developed in the multiparty computation literature. As such, the security guarantee of our result relies on cryptographic assumptions concerning the difficulty of inverting certain functions. In particular, we will assume the existence of a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, and for ease of discussion, we use the homomorphic encryption scheme of Paillier [21] .
Overview
In the next section, we briefly introduce the cryptographic tools and methods of proving privacy that we will need to guarantee security in the malicious adversary model. We also include in Section 2.2 a complete list of the subprotocols that will be used in this paper. Because most of the subprotocols that we use are general and have been described in previous MPC papers, we provide in Section 2.2 only a list of these protocols (possible implementations are included in Appendix B for completeness). An exception to this is our new Random Value Protocol, for which we provide full details and proof of security in Section 3.3, and a description of a two-party Division Protocol in Section 3.1. Finally, in Section 4, we introduce the single database k-means clustering protocol of [19] which we then extend to a secure two-party protocol in Section 4.3.
ACHIEVING PRIVACY
In multiparty computation (MPC) literature, devious behavior is modeled by the existence of an adversary who can corrupt one or more of the parties. In this paper, we will assume that the adversary is honest-but-curious, which means the adversary only learns the inputs/outputs of all of the corrupted parties, but the corrupted parties must engage in the protocol appropriately. We include in section 2.3 a formal definition of what it means for a protocol to "protect privacy" in the honest-but-curious adversary model (see also e.g. [10] for definitions of security against an honest-butcurious adversary).
In order to construct a private two-party k-means clustering protocol, we will utilize numerous subprotocols which themselves preserve privacy against an honest-but-curious adversary. We then use the fact that the composition of secure protocols remains secure (as proven in [5] ). The novel contributions of this paper are the Random Value Protocol and the description of a method to perform two-party secure division, described in Sections 3.3 and 3.1, respectively. All of the other subprotocols that we will use perform standard functionalities, and possible implementations of these that are secure against an honest-but-curious adversary have been described by (multiple) other authors. For such functionalities, we will utilize results of other authors (and their corresponding proofs of privacy and efficiency), citing possible references. A brief description of the subprotocols that we will use can be found below in Section 2.2. Proving privacy for our two-party k-means clustering protocol will therefore be reduced to proving privacy for our two protocols. In Section 2.3 below, we classify protocols that have a specified generic form, and prove that such protocols will be secure in the honest-but-curious adversary model. Privacy of our Division Protocol and Random Value Protocol will then follow because they have this generic form. In Section 2.1 below, we first introduce the cryptographic tools we will need to guarantee privacy. The casual reader may wish to skip the description of the cryptographic tools in Section 2.1 and read only the high-level arguments of security in the first paragraph of Section 2.3, omitting the formal definitions and proofs of privacy in the rest of that section.
Cryptographic Tools
We will utilize standard cryptographic tools to maintain privacy in our two-party k-means clustering protocol. It will be convenient to name our two participating parties, and we adopt the standard names of "Alice" and "Bob." We will first utilize an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, e.g. Paillier ([21] ). Thus, for encryptions we assume a message space ZN , where N = pq is the product of two K-bit primes and K is the security parameter. In the protocols that follow, one of the parties will be responsible for choosing the modulus N (we use the convention that Alice plays this role), and the opposite party (Bob) will be responsible for performing the requisite computations on encrypted data. The encryption scheme is a map E : ZN × H → G, where H represents some group from which we obtain randomness, and G is some other group. For notational convenience, we will write E(m) ∈ G rather than E(m, r). This encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, so that:
, where each addition refers to the appropriate group operation in G, ZN , or H. (For Paillier, G = Z × N 2 and thus the group operation is multiplication). Additionally, the encryption scheme allows a user to (efficiently) multiply by a constant, i.e. for c ∈ ZN , anyone can compute:
, where r ′ = r c ).
Privacy Protecting Protocols
We list here the generic subprotocols that will be used by our two-party k-means clustering protocol. All of the below protocols can be readily implemented using only the Scalar Product Protocol, and we include possible implementations in Appendix B. The Scalar Product Protocol is a standard protocol that has been explored much by other authors; we will not include an implementation of this protocol in this paper, but refer the reader to many possible references.
-Scalar Product Protocol (SPP). This protocol takes in x ∈ Z t N and y ∈ Z t N , and returns (shares of) some predetermined degree two function f (x, y) = P t i=1 cixiyi, for public constants ci. (See e.g. [9] , where they describe a protocol that achieves O(tK) communication complexity, K the security parameter. Other implementations can be found in [20] , [25] and [27] Protocol. These will be discussed when they arise in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 4.3.1.
Definition of Privacy in the Honest-But-Curious Model
We present first the high-level argument for how our protocols will protect each party's data. We have one of the parties (Alice) choose the encryption key, and encrypt all of her data using this key before sending it to the other party (Bob). Thus, Alice's privacy will be guaranteed by the semantic security assumption of the encryption scheme. Meanwhile, Bob will also encrypt his data using Alice's key, utilize the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme to perform the requisite computations, and then blind all of the outputs he sends to Alice with randomness of his choosing, ensuring that Alice can learn nothing about his data.
We now make these notions precise by first providing a formal definition of privacy protection in the honest-butcurious adversary model, and a formal proof of privacy for the class of protocols that attempt to protect privacy in the above described manner (both the definition and technique of providing privacy in this manner are standard tools used in MPC literature, see e.g. [10] ). Definition 1. Suppose that protocol X has Alice compute (and output) the function f A (x, y), and has Bob compute (and output) f B (x, y), where (x, y) denotes the inputs for Alice and Bob (respectively). Let VIEW A (x, y) (resp. VIEW B (x, y)) represent Alice's (resp. Bob's) view of the transcript. In other words, if (x, r A ) (resp. (y, r B )) denotes Alice's (resp. Bob's) input and randomness, then:
. . , mt), and
where the {mi} denote the messages passed between the parties. Also let O A (x, y) and O B (x, y) denote Alice's (resp. Bob's) output. Then we say that protocol X protects privacy (or is secure) against an honest-but-curious adversary if there exist probabilistic polynomial time simulators S1 and S2 such that: With the above definition of privacy protection, we now prove the basic lemma that will allow us to argue that our two-party k-means clustering protocol is secure against an honest-but-curious adversary. Lemma 1. Suppose that Alice has run the key generation algorithm for a semantically secure homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, and has given her public-key to Bob. Further suppose that Alice and Bob run Protocol X, for which all messages passed from Alice to Bob are encrypted using this scheme, and all messages passed from Bob to Alice are uniformly distributed (in the range of the ciphertext) and are independent of Bob's inputs. Then Protocol X is secure in the honest-but-curious adversary model.
Proof. We prove the privacy protecting nature of Protocol X in two separate cases, depending on which party the adversary has corrupted. To prove privacy, we show that for all PPT Adversaries, the view of the adversary based on Alice and Bob's interaction is indistinguishable to the adversary's view when the corrupted party interacts instead with a simulator. In other words, we show that there exist simulators S1 and S2 that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) from above.
Case 1: Bob is Corrupted by Adversary. We simulate Alice's messages sent to Bob. For each encryption that Alice is supposed to send to Bob, we let the simulator S2 pick a random element from ZN , and send an encryption of this. Any adversary who can distinguish between interaction with Alice verses interaction with S2 can be used to break the security assumptions of E. Thus, no such PPT adversary exists, which means (2) holds.
Case 2: Alice is Corrupted by Adversary. We simulate Bob's messages sent to Alice. To do this, every time Bob is to send an encryption to Alice, the simulator picks a random element of ZN and returns an encryption of this. Again, equation (1) holds due to the fact that Alice cannot distinguish the simulator's encryption of a random number from Bob's encryption of the correct computation that has been shifted by randomness of Bob's choice.
Since every semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme available today has a finite message space (e.g. ZN ), when our k-means protocol requires the data points (or attributes of the data points) to be encrypted, we must restrict the possible data values to a finite range. Therefore, instead of viewing the data points as living in R d , we "discretize" Euclidean space and approximate it via the lattice Z d N , for some large N . All of the results of this paper are consequently restricted to the model where the data points live in Z d N , (both in the "real" and "ideal" setting) and any function performing k-means clustering in this model is restricted to computations in ZN . Note that restricting to this "discretized" model is completely natural; indeed due to memory constraints, calculations performed on computers are handled in this manner. As a consequence of working in the discretized space model, we also avoid privacy issues that arise from possible rounding errors (i.e. restricting input to be in Z d N avoids the necessity of approximating inputs in R by rounding up or down).
PRIVATE DIVISION AND SAMPLING PROTOCOLS
Two-Party Division
As mentioned in Section 1.2, performing two-party division has been an obstacle to obtaining a secure two-party k-means clustering protocol. In this section and the next, we discuss our methods for overcoming this obstacle. In particular, we make precise what we mean by division in the ring ZN , and show that this definition not only matches our intuition as to what division should be, but also allows us to perform division in a secure way. Then in the following section, we discuss how two parties can choose a value R ∈ ZQ uniformly at random, where Q ∈ ZN is not known by either party, but is shared between them.
Let P, D ∈ ZN . Then viewing P and D as integers, we may apply the Division Algorithm to find unique integers Q < N and 0 ≤ R < D such that P = QD + R. Viewing Q ∈ ZN , we then define division (of P by D) to be the quotient Q. Note that this definition is the natural restriction of division in R to the integers, in that Q represents the actual quotient in R that has been rounded down to the nearest integer. Thus this definition coincides much more closely to real division (e.g. for purposes of finding averages) than other alternatives, such as defining division to be multiplication by the inverse.
In defining what it means for a protocol to be secure (see Section 2.3), one compares the information that could be obtained in an ideal model (where a trusted third party exists) verses what could be obtained in the real world (where no such third party exists, and the proposed protocol is employed). In terms of defining the function that is to be evaluated (which performs the k-means clustering), we force the definition of division to match the above definition. In other words, when the functions f A (x, y) and f B (x, y) (see notation of Section 2.3) call for division to be performed, these divisions are defined to mean division in the ring ZN as defined here. This way, when our protocol is run and division is performed in this way, it matches the computations that the functions f A and f B are performing. With these definitions in place, it remains to implement a secure division subprotocol that computes Q and returns shares to Alice and Bob. We describe below a possible implementation, which has been reduced to the Scalar Product Protocol combined with the Find Minimum of 2 Numbers Protocol, and consequently its security follows from the security of those subprotocols.
Possible Implementation of the Division Protocol
Input. Alice and Bob share , where the i th coordinate of γ is a 1 iff 2 i D < N .
th call to FM2NP, Pi := Pi−1 − Oi−12 K−i−1 D, P1 := P , and γ0 := 1. 3. Notice that Q = P K i=1 Oi2 K−i , which can be locally computed by Alice and Bob from their shares of Oi from the previous step.
The Random Value Protocol (RVP)
We describe here how two parties (Alice and Bob) can choose a value R ∈ ZQ uniformly at random, where Q ∈ ZN is not known by either party, but is shared between them. Before we describe the protocol, we provide motivation for why the problem is interesting. After all, with a division protocol in hand, one could simply have Alice and Bob choose an arbitrary R ′ ∈ ZN (which is trivial to accomplish), and then use the division protocol to find its modulus in ZQ, and set this to be R. 
.Q]). Since the functions f
A and f B will be drawing R uniformly from ZQ, having our protocol contruct R from R ′ as above (which as noted is not uniformly distributed if Q ∤ N ) will make it impossible to find simulators as in (1) and (2) . We therefore need to find a way to sample uniformly from ZQ without revealing any information about Q to either party.
We would like for Alice and Bob to not have any knowledge about the random value R they pick, a notion made more precise in the following definition:
Definition 2. Let VIEW
A (respectively VIEW B ) denote Alice's (resp. Bob's) view of an execution of the RVP. We say that Alice and Bob have chosen R obliviously if: ∀Q ∈ ZN , ∀α ∈ ZQ,
Additionally, we would like Q to remain unknown to both parties throughout the execution of the protocol. That Q remains unknown to both parties will follow from the fact that the below protocol is secure (as in definition 1), and obliviousness of R will be proved in Theorem 1 below. The protocol proceeds by first describing how Alice and Bob make S ∈ ZQ which is chosen uniformly at random, but Alice may have partial knowledge of its value (Bob however is oblivious to the value of S). This is followed by the two parties forming T ∈ ZQ in an analogous manner but with their roles reversed, so that it is Bob who may have partial knowledge about T , and Alice who is oblivious. From these they will set R = S + T (Mod Q).
We present first a brief high-level description of how they make S ∈ ZQ. We imagine the numbers 0 through Q − 1 to be partitioned into groups that each have size a power of 2, as determined by the binary expansion of Q. 
th set has size 2 j , then we set S to be Si with probability
Description of the Protocol
Input. Alice has Q A ∈ ZN and Bob has Q B ∈ ZN . Output. Alice and Bob share R ∈ ZQ, where R has been chosen obliviously (as in Definition 2) and uniformly at random. More specifically, Alice has R A ∈ ZN and Bob has R B such that:
. Cost. This protocol will add O(K 2 ) to communication. Note. This protocol first requires that Bob knows the decryption key for some homomorphic encryption scheme with security parameter K, so that Alice can perform computations on their joint inputs without being able to decrypt. The protocol then flips the roles of Alice and Bob, so it is Alice who will need to hold a decryption key, and Bob who is unable to decrypt. This situation is trivial to produce, since Bob (resp. Alice) can choose their own RSA modulus N B (resp. N A ) of K-bits, which will be used during the appropriate half of the protocol. Initially, Q is shared with respect to Alice's encryption scheme, i.e.
. Therefore, before running the first half of this protocol, Alice and Bob convert their shares of Q (with respect to N A ) to shares of Q (with respect to N B ). Steps 1-5 describe the first half of the protocol, where Bob's encryption key (with respect to N B ) is used, and then Step 6 (which repeats Steps 1-5 with the roles reversed) is done using Alice's encryption key (w.r.t. N A ). For ease of notation, we will drop the superscripts on N , remembering which modulus we are working in (which flips for Step 6).
1. This step produces a reordering of [1. .K] such that if P (i, j) denotes the probability that i appears before j, then P (i, j) = 2 i−j P (j, i) (note that this reordering will be independent of any input to the protocol). The purpose of this reordering will be to select S = Si with the appropriate probability. Label this reordering {x1, . . . , xK}, where each xi ∈ [1.
.K] appears exactly once. Initialize V = 2 K − 2 and define Vi := V + 1 (Mod 2 i−1 ) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K + 1. Alice repeats the following for each 1 ≤ l ≤ K: (a) Alice chooses a random number X l ∈ [0..V ], and sets
x l −1 and re-calculates each Vi. 2. This step creates the partitions of Q into sets that have sizes a power of 2 described above. Alice and Bob run the To Binary Protocol (TBP) on Q to get shares of the bits of Q = qK . . . q1. Alice and Bob then obtain shares of Qi := Q (Mod 2 i−1 ) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K by performing the appropriate computation on their shares of the bits of Q. For instance, Alice will set:
where Q 
. It remains to explain how Alice will pick Si from {S1, . . . , SK} with appropriate probability. 4. This step will choose (with correct probability) the S * (for some index S * ∈ {S1, . . . , SK }), for which Alice will set S = S * = U * + Q * . Namely, it will produce shares of the characteristic vector δ * that has a '1' in the * th coordinate and zeroes elsewhere. Letting ei denote the characteristic vector with a '1' in the i th position, we use the following equation to define δ * (we leave it to the reader to verify that δ * will choose S * from {S1, . . . , SK } with correct probability):
Recall that the {xi} are from Step 1 above. For brevity, we have Alice compute δ * by running the subprotocol Compute δ * Protocol, which can be found in Appendix B with the other subprotocols. 5. Alice and Bob can now share S = S * by running the SPP on the function:
f (x, y) = δ * · (S1, . . . , SK).
6. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1-5 with their roles reversed, so that Alice and Bob share T . Now S and T are elements of ZQ, and we would like to perform the sum S + T (Mod Q). However, Alice and Bob cannot simply add their own shares of S and T because these shares correspond to two different moduli N A and N B . (Recall that S was created using Bob's encryption key, and is therefore shared between Alice and Bob modulo N B , while T is shared between them modulo N A .) A little work must be done to convert the shares of S (which are w.r.t. N B ) to shares of S (now w.r.t N A ), and then compute S + T (Mod Q). We leave the details to the reader.
Proof of Obliviousness and Security
Notice that the only communication between Alice and Bob in the above protocol takes place in the form of the subprotocols TBP, Compute δ * Protocol, and SPP. The protocol is therefore secure if each of those subprotocols are secure, by the composition theorem of [5] . Since we are using a secure Scalar Product Protocol (e.g. of [9] or [25] ) and the TBP and Compute δ * Protocol (see Appendix B) are both secure, it follows that our Random Value Protocol is secure against an honest-but-curious adversary. It remains to show that the output R ∈ ZQ is chosen uniformly and obliviously to both parties. Theorem 1. The above described Random Value Protocol outputs shares of R ∈ ZQ such that R has been chosen obliviously (as in definition 2) and uniformly at random.
Proof. The fact that R is chosen obliviously follows from three simple claims: Claim 1. During Alice's portion of the protocol (Steps 1-5), the distribution of choices for S is uniform in ZQ. Conversely for T during Bob's portion of the protocol (Step 6).
Claim 2.
If Y is any fixed number in ZQ and X represents a random variable uniformly distributed in ZQ, then the random variable Z := Y + X (Mod Q) is uniformly distributed in ZQ.
Claim 3. If a party's view includes knowledge of Y but no knowledge of X, then Z is oblivious to that party.
We leave the proofs of these claims to the reader, but note that all three claims result from straightforward combinatorial arguments. The fact that R = S + T (Mod Q) is a random variable follows from the fact that both S and T are chosen uniformly at random in ZQ, and then letting e.g. X = S and Y = T in Claim 2 above, we have by Claim 2 that R is uniformly distributed in ZQ. The fact that R is oblivious follows from Claim 3.
As an aside, we note that Claim 2 actually guarantees that this protocol chooses R obliviously even if one of the parties is corrupted maliciously. The Random Value Protocol can therefore be used as a subprotocol in models allowing a malicious adversary, provided that the TBP, Compute δ * Protocol, and SPP utilized by the RVP are all secure against a malicious adversary.
TWO-PARTY K-MEANS CLUSTERING PROTOCOL
Notation and Preliminaries
Following the setup of [13] , we assume that two parties, "Alice" and "Bob," each hold (partial) data describing the d attributes of n objects (we assume Alice and Bob both know d and n). Their aggregate data comprises the (virtual) database D, holding the complete information of each of the n objects. The goal is to design an efficient algorithm that allows Alice and Bob to perform k-means clustering on their aggregate data in a manner that protects their private data.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are working in the model where our data points are viewed as living in Z d N for some large RSA modulus N chosen by Alice. Note that if Alice and Bob desire a lattice width of W and M denotes the maximum Euclidean distance between points, then Alice will pick N sufficiently large to guarantee that N ≥ n 2 M 2 W 2 (this inequality guarantees that the sum of all data points does not exceed N ). Because Alice chooses the RSA modulus, Bob will be performing the bulk of the computation (on the encrypted data points).
We allow the data points to be arbitrarily partitioned between Alice and Bob (see [13] ). This means that there is no assumed pattern to how Alice and Bob hold attributes of different data points (in particular, this subsumes the cases of vertically and horizontally partitioned data). We only demand that between them, each of the d attributes of all n data points is known by either Alice or Bob, but not both. As discussed in [23] , attributes of the data points that are measured in units significantly larger than others will dominate distance calculations. Alice and Bob may therefore wish to standardize the data before running a k-means clustering protocol on it. The manner in which this standardization is achieved depends on the nature of the data and we do not explore the possibilities here. Rather, we note that any such standardization can likely be achieved with the Scalar Product Protocol and Division Protocol. For a given data point Di ∈ D, we denote Alice's share of its attributes by D 
Single Database k-Means Algorithms
The single database k-means clustering algorithm that we extend to the two-party setting was introduced by [19] and is summarized below. We chose this algorithm because under appropriate conditions on the distribution of the data, the algorithm is provably correct (as opposed to most other algorithms that are used in practice which have no such provable guarantee of correctness). Additionally, the Initialization Phase (or "seeding process") is done in an optimized manner, reducing the number of iterations required in the Lloyd
Step. The algorithm is as follows (see [19] for details):
Step I: Initialization. This procedure chooses the cluster centers µ1, . . . ,µ k according to (an equivalent version of) the protocol described in [19] :
A. Center of Gravity. Compute the center of gravity of the n data points and denote this by C:
B. Distance to Center of Gravity. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, compute the distance (squared) between C and Di. Denote this as e C
n , the average (squared) distance. D. Pick First Cluster Center. Pick µ1 = Di with probability:
E. Iterate to Pick the Remaining Cluster Centers. Pick µ2, . . . , µ k as follows: Suppose µ1, . . . , µj−1 have already been chosen (initially j=2), then we pick µj by:
, the distance (squared) between Di and µj−1.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let e
Ci denote the minimum of { e C 3. UpdateC to be the average of e Ci (over all 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
4. Set µj = Di with probability:
Step II: Lloyd
Step. Repeat the following until ν1, . . . , ν k is sufficiently close to µ1, . . . , µ k :
A. Finding the Closest Cluster Centers. For each data point Di ∈ D, find the closest cluster center µj ∈ {µ1, . . . , µ k }, and assign data point Di to cluster j. B. Calculating the New Cluster Centers. For each cluster j, calculate the new cluster center νj by finding the average position of all data points in cluster j. Share these new centers between Alice and Bob as ν 
Our Two-Party k-Means Clustering Protocol
We now extend the k-means algorithm of [19] to a twoparty setting. Section 4.3.1 below discusses how to implement Step I of the above algorithm (the Initialization), and section 4.3.2 discusses how to implement Step II of the algorithm (the Lloyd Step). We discuss in Appendix A alternative approaches in the number of iterations allowed in the Lloyd Step, and why this question is an issue in terms of protecting privacy.
Step I: Initialization
We now describe how to extend Step I of the above algorithm to the two-party setting. In particular, we need to explain how to perform the computations from Step I in a secure way. As output, Alice should have shares of the cluster centers µ A. Center of Gravity. To implement Step A of our algorithm, we need Alice and Bob to compute and share:
Since Bob has Alice's encrypted data, Bob can locally compute (encryptions) of the above sums, and return a (randomized) share of the sum to Alice. They may then run the Division Protocol to share C.
B. Distance to Center of Gravity. Bob can perform all the computations outlined in the Distance Protocol on the encrypted data to obtain an encryption of e C 0 i , where e C 0 i is the distance (squared) between C and Di. He randomizes this encryption and returns it to Alice, so that they share e C C. Average Squared Distance. Define the following sums:
A,0 i
and
, which Alice and Bob can compute locally. They then run the DivP on the inputs P and P ′ , and D := n. As output, Alice and Bob will be sharingC as desired.
D. Pick First Cluster Center. Notice that picking a data point Di with probabilityC
is equivalent to picking a random number R ∈ [0..2nC − 1] and finding the first i such that R ≤ P i j=1C + e C 0 j . We use this observation to pick data points according to weighted probabilities as follows:
B . Alice and Bob run the Random Value Protocol (RVP) with Q := 2nC = 2nC
A + 2nC B to generate and share a random number R = R A + R B ∈ Z 2nC . 2. Alice and Bob will next compare their random number R with the sum P i j=1C + e C 0 j , and find the first i such that R ≤ P i j=1C + e C 0 j . They will then set µ1 = Di. The actual implementation of this can be found in the Choose µ1 Protocol in Appendix B.
E. Iterate to Pick the Remaining Cluster Centers.
1. This step is done analogously to Step I.B.
2. This step is supposed to calculate the minimum of { e C l i } j−1 l=0 . However, they don't have to take the minimum over all j numbers, since from the previous iteration of this step, they ) so that they share the location of
Ci, e C j−1 i
} by running the SPP on inputs
3. This step is done analogously to Step I.C.
This step is done analogously to
Step I.D.
Step II: Lloyd Step
In this section, we discuss how to implement the Lloyd Step while maintaining privacy protection.
A. Finding the Closest Cluster Centers. Alice and Bob repeat the following for each Di ∈ D:
1. Find the Distance (squared) to Each Cluster Center.
Note that because finding the minimum of all distances is equivalent to finding the minimum of the distances squared, we will calculate the latter. Since Bob has (encryptions of) Alice's shares of the data points and the cluster centers, Bob can go through the computations of the DistP to obtain for each cluster center j the (encrypted) distance Xi,j of data point Di to cluster center j. As usual, Bob randomizes each distance and returns them to Alice, so that for each j, Alice and Bob share the vector Xi = (Xi,1, . . . X i,k ).
Alice and Bob run the Find Minimum of k Numbers
Protocol (FMkNP) on X A i and X B i to obtain a share of (a vector representation of) the location of the closest cluster center to Di:
Ci := (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), (6) where the 1 appears in the j th coordinate if cluster center µj is closest to Di. Note that in actuality, Ci is shared between Alice and Bob:
, and Alice encrypts her share and sends this to Bob. B. Calculating the New Cluster Centers. The following will be done for each cluster 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We break the calculation into three steps: In Step 1, Bob will compute the sum of data points in cluster j, in Step 2 he will compute the total number of points in cluster j, and in Step 3 the result of Step 1 will be divided by the result of Step 2. To simplify the notation, by E(Ci) we will mean (E (Ci,1) , . . . , E(C i,d )).
1. Sum of Data Points in Cluster j. In this step, Bob will compute the sum of all data points in cluster j. We denote this sum as: = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) , where the 1 appears in the m th cluster if Di is closest to cluster m. Therefore, for cluster j we would like to sum:
Ci,jDi.
Utilizing the homomorphic and single multiplication properties of E, Bob can compute (an encryption) of Sj , returning a randomized share to Alice so that they share Sj as desired.
Number of Data Points in Cluster j. Now Alice and
Bob wish to share the total number of points in cluster j, denoted by Tj. Notice that:
Ci,j,
i.e. Tj can be found by summing the j th coordinate of Ci for each i. Bob can compute Tj using his own shares of Ci and Alice's encrypted shares, and randomizing his computation, Alice and Bob share Tj. 
Communication Analysis
Analyzing the communication between Alice and Bob in the two-party k-means clustering protocol presented in Section 4.3 demonstrates that our protocol achieves communication complexity:
Recall that k is the number of clusters, K is the security parameter, n is the number of data points, d is the number of attributes of each data point, m is the number of iterations in the Lloyd Step, O(ξs) is the communication cost of (securely) finding the minimum of two numbers, and O(ζs) is the communication cost of performing (secure) two-party division (where division is defined as in Section 3.1). In this paper, we showed that ξs ≤ O(K 2 ) and ζs ≤ Kξs. Therefore, if the size of the database is sufficiently large so that n ≥ dK, then the second term of (8) will dominate the third and our protocol will have communication complexity bounded by:
The communication cost of our protocol matches the communication complexity of [13] while simultaneously enjoying the extra guarantee of security against an honest-but-curious adversary. As mentioned in the Introduction, k-means clustering can also be performed securely by applying generic tools from multi-party computation, e.g. via Yao's garbled circuit (see [26] ). Let ξns denote the communication cost of finding the minimum of two numbers that are shared between two parties (non-securely), and ζns denote the communication cost of a non-secure division protocol. Notice that a circuit representation of the single database k-means clustering protocol of [19] has size at least:
The first term is necessary e.g. to add together all the data points in each cluster during each iteration of the Lloyd Step, the second term is necessary to e.g. find the minimum of k numbers for each data point (when deciding which cluster the data point belongs to), and the third term is necessary for performing a division for each dimension of each cluster center. With the above assumption that n ≥ dK and the fact that ζns ≤ Kξns, we have that the second term of (10) will dominate the third. Also, any implementation of a protocol that finds the minimum of two (K-bit) numbers will cost at least O(K). Using these observations and the fact that applying Yao's garbled circuit techniques to a circuit of size O(|C|) has communication complexity O(K|C|), we have that the communication complexity of a generic solution is at least:
Notice that the second term of our protocol's communication complexity in (9) matches that of the generic solution in (11), while our first term enjoys asymptotic advantage of a factor of mk over the first term of (11) . Furthermore, if d is sufficiently large so that d ≥ K, then the first term of equation (11) dominates, in which case our protocol has overall asymptotic advantage over a generic solution by a factor of d/K.
We note that there O(K log c K)-sized circuits that can perform integer reciprocation (see [22] ). Assuming these methods can be translated to perform division as defined in Section 3.1, we could apply Yao's garbled circuit techniques locally (i.e. not for the entire k-means protocol, but only for division), in which case the second term in (8) will dominate the third as long as n ≥ d log c K (instead of n ≥ dK).
CONCLUSION
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the proof of security of the two-party k-means clustering protocol presented above follows from the fact that each of the subprotocols are secure. The only exception to this is in step C of the Lloyd
Step, where Alice and Bob must decide if their protocol has reached the termination condition. Although Alice and Bob remain oblivious to any actual values at this stage, they will gain the information of exactly how many iterations were required in the Lloyd
Step. There are various ways of defining the model to handle this potential information leak and thus maintain perfect privacy protection (see Appendix A).
APPENDIX
A. ALTERNATIVE COMPUTATION OF THE K-MEANS CLUSTER CENTERS
It is possible that the iterative nature of the Lloyd Step may reveal undesirable information to the two parties: the number of iterations that are performed in the Lloyd Step. We suggest three different approaches to handle this privacy concern:
• Approach 1: Reveal Number of Iterations. If Alice and Bob agree beforehand that this minor leak of information will not compromise the privacy of their data, they can choose to run our algorithm (as is) so that this is the only privacy leak.
• Approach 2: Set the Number of Iterations to be Proportional to n. In general, the more data points, the more iterations are necessary to reach the stopping condition. Based on n, one could therefore approximate the expected number of iterations that should be necessary, and fix our protocol to perform this many iterations.
• Approach 3: Fix the Number of Iterations to be Constant. In [19] , it is argued that if the data points enjoy certain "nice" properties, then the number of iterations is extremely small (i.e. with high probability, only 2 iterations are necessary). Thus, fixing the number of iterations to be some (small) constant will (with high probability) not result in a premature termination of the Lloyd Step (i.e. the stopping condition will likely have been reached).
Each approach has its pros and cons. Approach 1 guarantees the accuracy of the final output (as the stopping criterion has been met) in the minimal number of steps, but leaks information about how many iterations were performed. Approach 2 succeeds with high probability, but may unnecessarily affect communication complexity if the fixed number of iterations is higher than necessary. Approach 3 keeps communication minimal, but runs a higher risk of losing accuracy of the final output (i.e. if the stopping criterion hasn't been reached after the fixed number of iterations have been completed). In the body of our paper, we assumed Approach 1, although it is trivial to modify our algorithm to implement instead Approach 2 or 3.
B. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF PROTOCOLS FROM SECTION 2.2
We describe here possible implementations of each of the (non-referenced) protocols listed in Section 2.2. We provide these implementations solely for the purpose of completion, and make no claim concerning their efficiency in relation to other existing protocols that perform the same tasks. Since we need each of these protocols to be secure against an honest-but-curious adversary, we need the communication in each subprotocol to be in the generic form of Lemma 1 or to utilize other protocols that are already known to be secure; and indeed this will be the case in each of the following.
B.1 Description of the Find Minimum of 2 Numbers Protocol
Input 
where ⊕ signifies XOR, and the other operations are performed in Z N . Shares of L can then be obtained by running the SPP many times, utilizing the fact that:
where addition on the left hand side is in Z 2 and on the right hand side is in Z N . We omit the specific details due to space consideration.
B.2 Description of the Find Minimum of k Numbers Protocol
This subprotocol is a simple extension of the above. If the communication cost of the FM2NP is O(ξs), then this protocol will have communication complexity O(kξs).
B.3 Description of the To Binary Protocol
Input. As input to this protocol, Alice and Bob share X = X A + X B < N/2. Output. If X = x 1 x 2 . . . x K is the binary representation for X, then as output Alice and Bob should share each bit x i = x A i + x B i (Mod N ).
Cost. Communication cost of this protocol is O(K 2 ).
Note. This protocol is made slightly more difficult due to the two possibilities: 
where addition above is standard addition in Z 2 K (performed base 2, with carry-over). We perform addition (base 2) in the usual way: start on the right and add the bits via XOR, keeping track of carry-over. Again we omit the details, but note that addition modulo 2 can be handled by using the SPP together with (13).
B.4 Description of the Bigger Than N Protocol
Input. As input to this protocol, Alice and Bob share X = X A + X B , where X < N/2. 
Thus, a simple execution of the SPP yields shares of O as desired.
B.5 Compute γ Protocol
Input. Alice and Bob share D ∈ Z N . Output. Alice and Bob share γ∈ Z
, where the i th coordinate of γ is a 1 iff 2 i D < N . Cost. Communication cost of this protocol is O(Kξs), where ξs is the cost of a secure F M 2N P protocol. 
B.6 Choose µ1 Protocol
Input. Alice and Bob have run the RVP, which has returned to them shares of a random R ∈ Z 2nC . They also shareC and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, they share e C i . Output. Alice and Bob share µ 1 = D i , where D i has been chosen with the correct probability. Cost. Communication cost of this protocol is O(nξs). Notice that the i th coord. of Z A is iC A − R A + P i j=1 e C A,0 j . Bob does similarly to obtain Z B . 2. Alice and Bob run the FMnNP on the vector Z ∈ Z n N , which will return the (shares of) L, the location of the first time R ≤ P i j=1C + e C 0 . Alice encrypts her share L A and sends this to Bob. 3. Bob can now compute (an encryption of) the scalar product:
More precisely, Bob will have to compute d scalar products, one for each dimension. After randomizing each product, he returns these values to Alice, so that they now share µ 1 .
B.7 Compute δ * Protocol
Input. Alice and Bob share Q = Q A + Q B , and if Q = q K . . . q 1 , then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K, they also share q i = q A i + q B i (Mod N ). Alice also has a reordering of the integers [1..K], which is denoted {x 1 , . . . , x K }. Output. The vector δ * = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0), a unit vector with a '1' in the appropriate coordinate, has been chosen correctly (see RVP for precise definition of this), and is shared between Alice and Bob. Cost. Communication cost of this protocol is O(K 2 ). Note. In this protocol, the roles of Alice and Bob will be reversed, so thatÊ will represent a homomorphic encryption function that Bob can decrypt but Alice cannot. Alice now utilizes the homomorphic properties ofÊ to calculate (an encryption of) δ * . 5. Alice chooses new randomness and blinds δ * with this, returning the result to Bob who can decrypt so that Alice and Bob now share δ * .
